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Abstract—We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an
electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts.
In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using
public information about a conditional expectation of energy
production but use private information about the forecast error
distribution. This information is given in the form of samples
and incorporated into profit-maximizing optimizations of market
participants through chance constraints. We model information
asymmetry by varying the sample size of participants’ private
information. We show that with more information available, the
equilibrium gradually converges to the ideal solution provided
by the perfect information scenario. Under information scarcity,
however, we show that the market converges to the ideal equilib-
rium if participants are to infer the forecast error distribution
from the statistical properties of the data at hand or share their
private forecasts.
Index Terms—Chance-constrained programming, Equilibrium,
Forecast asymmetry, Information asymmetry, Uncertainty
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of electricity markets with high penetrations
of renewable energy sources clear several trading floors, e.g.,
day-ahead and in real-time, to offset potential imbalances
induced by renewable forecast errors. Given a forecast of
renewable generation, the day-ahead stage determines the
optimal allocation of energy and reserves to offset any forecast
deviation at the real-time stage. To enable reliable and cost-
efficient operations, one of the existing suggestions in the
technical literature is to optimize the day-ahead decisions
using stochastic programming [1]. By taking a probabilistic
forecast as input, either in the form of discrete scenarios [2]
or moments of forecast error distribution [3], stochastic models
produce robust day-ahead decisions.
A common assumption in the literature is that all market
participants use identical information about the uncertainty
distribution of renewable generation. We refer to this situation
as forecast symmetry. However, market participants may use
various forecasting tools of different quality or source their
forecasts from different providers. Market participants often
treat their forecasts as private data and have no means of evalu-
ating the benefits from sharing their forecasts. Moreover, even
with identical forecasts, market participants with heteroge-
neous risk attitudes [4], [5] or irrational preferences [6] utilize
the available data differently. Hence, we relax the assumption
of forecast symmetry and explore the impacts of asymmetric
renewable forecasts on electricity market outcomes.
There are a few works addressing forecast asymmetry and
its impacts on electricity market outcomes. Using a scenario-
based stochastic programming and a game-theoretic analysis,
[7] illustrates how the social welfare in competitive elec-
tricity markets varies as a function of the level of forecast
asymmetry among market participants. In oligopolistic setting,
[8] analyzes the impact of public dissemination of aggregate
renewable power forecast on market outcomes.
In this work, we study the impacts of renewable forecast
asymmetry among market participants on the social and indi-
vidual market outcomes. To assess these impacts, we build
a stochastic equilibrium model, including a set of profit-
maximizing optimization problems, one per market partici-
pant, coupled by power balance conditions. In our model, each
market participant optimizes its expected profit, while using
its own private information about forecast error distribution.
This information is obtained from independent providers and
given in a form of samples. To model the forecast asymmetry,
we vary the sample size of private forecast datasets. To
incorporate private forecasts into the stochastic equilibrium
model, we develop a chance-constrained optimization for
profit-maximization problem of each market participant. Using
the sample representation of forecast errors, the objective
function and the feasible region of market participant problem
are made conditional on the private forecast.
Using a stylized case study, we conduct three experiments.
First, we explore the market implications of forecast asym-
metry and illustrate that system reliability and operating cost
may significantly improve even with a marginal increase in the
sample size of private forecast datasets. We also show that the
system reliability converges to a desirable level comparatively
faster than the operating cost. Then, we study two approaches
to enhance the market operation under data scarcity. We
introduce a case where market participants are able to infer the
stochastic process distribution from the statistical properties
learned from the data at hand. Through learning, the reliability
significantly improves even if the size of dataset provided by
forecast providers is relatively small. Third, we show that there
might be some circumstances under which market participants
have strong incentives for sharing their private forecasts as it
improves not only the overall market performance, but also
their individual profit outcomes.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section II
details the transition from a centralized stochastic model with
symmetric forecasts to a stochastic equilibrium model with
forecast asymmetry. Section III incorporates private forecasts
into individual optimization problems. Section IV streamlines
the decentralized algorithm to compute equilibrium solution.
Section V provides the results of the three experiments on a
stylized system. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. MARKET CLEARING: FROM A CENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION TO AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
A. Preliminaries
We consider a day-ahead electricity market with a high share
of renewable energy production. This market is cleared 12–36
hours ahead of real time to meet total load L and offset any
imbalance induced by uncertain renewable energy production
in a reliable and cost-efficient manner. The expected renewable
energy production is given by a point forecast wf assumed to
be a public information. The real-time deviation from wf is
given by a zero-mean random forecast error denoted by w.
The distribution of w is considered to be a private information
for each market participant, and thereby, market participants
may have asymmetric information about the random forecast
error w. Note that we make no assumption on the type of
distribution ofw. The set G solely includes conventional power
producers. Following an affine policy for reserve allocation [9],
the eventual production of each conventional producer i ∈ G
in real-time, i.e., pi, is considered as an affine function of
forecast error, i.e.,
pi = pi − αiw, αi > 0, i ∈ G, (1)
where pi is the nominal dispatch in the day-ahead stage and αi
is a portion of renewable power deviation adjusted by producer
i, the so-called participation factor. Both pi and αi are day-
ahead stage decision variables. By using (1), producers co-
optimize their day-ahead dispatch decision and participation
in real-time adjustment with respect to the realization of the
forecast error. To ensure that the entire deviation from the
forecast is accommodated, we enforce the adjustment balance
as
∑
i∈G αi = 1. Each producer i outputs within its operational
limits [p
i
, pi
]
and adjusts its production in real-time by at most
ri. The production cost of each producer is quadratic with the
first- and second-order coefficients c1i and c2i, respectively.
B. Centralized optimization model
Under an assumption of identical forecast for all market
participants, the market is cleared in a centralized manner
using a stochastic optimization model as
min
p,α>0
E
[∑
i∈G
(
c2ip
2
i + c1ipi
)]
(2a)
s.t. P


pi − αiw 6 pi, ∀i ∈ G
pi − αiw > pi, ∀i ∈ G
αiw 6 ri, ∀i ∈ G
αiw > −ri, ∀i ∈ G

 > 1− ε, (2b)
∑
i∈G
pi + w
f − L = 0 : λe, (2c)
∑
i∈G
αi = 1 : λ
r, (2d)
where E(·) is the expectation operator and P(·) is the proba-
bility operator, whereas the random forecast error w follows a
distribution with known parameters for all market participants.
The objective function (2a) minimizes the expected total oper-
ating cost of the system. The chance constraint (2b) is enforced
to ensure that constraints of all producers hold jointly with a
probability at least (1−ε). The maximum allowable constraint
violation probability ε is a measure of the acceptable level
of risk exposure and is kept small to ensure a reliable real-
time operation. The equality constraint (2c) enforces the power
production and consumption balance in the day-ahead stage.
Finally, (2d) ensures allocating sufficient reserve, such that the
entire renewable power production imbalance in real-time will
be offset. The dual variables of the equality constraints define
the energy price λe and the reserve price λr.
C. Equilibrium model
By design, the centralized problem (2) does not incorporate
the private information on forecast error distribution. To model
market outcomes with private forecasts, we introduce the
following stochastic equilibrium problem:


max
pi,αi>0
λepi − λ
rαi − Ei
[
c2ip
2
i + c1ipi
]
s.t. Pi


pi − αiw 6 pi
pi − αiw > pi
αiw 6 ri
αiw > −ri

 > 1− εi


, ∀i ∈ G, (3a)
max
λe
λe
[∑
i∈G
pi + w
f − L
]
, (3b)
max
λr
λr
[∑
i∈G
αi − 1
]
, (3c)
where each conventional producer i ∈ G maximizes its
expected profit in (3a) for given energy and reserve prices.
Besides, for given values of pi and αi, the unconstrained
problems (3b) and (3c) set the energy and reserve prices. One
can observe that the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of (3b)
and (3c) respectively yield the balancing constraints (2c) and
(2d). Unlike the centralized optimization (2), Ei(·), Pi(·), and
εi in (3a) are indexed by i, indicating that each conventional
producer incorporates its own information about forecast error
distribution. With asymmetric information, the solution of (3)
does not amount to that of (2), and the corresponding market
implications are the main focus of this paper.
III. INCORPORATION OF PRIVATE FORECASTS AND
CHANCE CONSTRAINTS REFORMULATION
We model the private information of each conventional
producer i ∈ G on forecast error distribution w by a finite
set of samples, i.e., Di := {wi1,..., wis}, ∀i ∈ G. This
sample representation enables a distribution-free reformulation
of individual optimization problems (3a).
We first start with reformulating the objective function
of (3a). The expected production cost for each conventional
producer expresses as
Ei
[
c2ip
2
i + c1ipi
]
= Ei
[
c2i(pi − αiw)
2 + c1i(pi − αiw)
]
= c2ip
2
i + c1ipi + Ei
[
c2i(αiw)
2
]
= c2ip
2
i + c1ipi + c2i(αiσˆi)
2, (4)
where σˆ2i denotes the variance of the forecast error distribution
obtained from the sample-based dataset Di.
With the sample representation of random variable w, a
straightforward methodology to reformulate the joint chance
constraint in (3a) is to enforce its entries on each sample of the
forecast error distribution [10]. However, this methodology is
computationally expensive as the size of dataset required for
achieving a probabilistic performance guarantee grows in the
number of decision variables [10, Theorem 4]. To ease the
computational burden, we refer to the work in [11] that offers
a compromised solution between sample approximation and
robust optimization. In [11], the constraints are enforced over
the vertices (bounds for scalar uncertainties) of the minimum
volume of the hyper-rectangular uncertainty set. This allows
to re-define the requirement for the size of dataset as in [11,
Equations (7)], which is independent from the number of
decision variables. Instead, the size of sample-based dataset
required for the chance constraint to hold grows in the number
of uncertainty sources, which amounts to one in our case.
In line with [11], we consider that conventional producers
bound the support of forecast error distribution as wi :=
min{wi1,..., wis} and wi := max{wi1,..., wis}, yielding wi 6
0 6 wi. Now, for each conventional producer, the joint chance
constraint (3a) is approximated through a set of inequalities
pi − αiwi 6 pi, αiwi > −ri, (5a)
pi − αiwi > pi, αiwi 6 ri. (5b)
These inequalities intuitively exhibit the direct impact of
sample-based dataset Di on reserve margins required to pro-
vide adjustment in real time. With smaller sample support
[wi, wi], the producers reserve less capacity to offset the
forecast error in real time.
Notice, in what follows, we do not specify εi for each
producer i required for sample generation in [11]. Instead, we
directly analyze the dependency of the system-wide reliability
on the size of sample-based dataset of conventional producers.
We explain this rationale with an illustration in Fig. 1. With
a relatively small size of sample-based dataset, there is a risk
of not capturing the entire range of forecast error realizations,
eventually leading to a small system reliability. As a result,
expensive extreme balancing actions, such as renewable power
spillage or load curtailment, would be required to restore
the real-time balance. With an increasing size of sample-
based dataset, the union of datasets of producers may suffice
to keep the system in balance with high probability, which
improves the system reliability. With a sufficiently large size
of sample-based dataset, all producers are available to balance
any realization of the forecast error. In this scenario, the
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Fig. 1. Relation between the size of sample-based dataset of conventional
producers and the market operation.
dispatch is solely driven by the marginal cost of generation,
thus improving the overall operating cost.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
We compute the solution to the equilibrium problem (3)
using an iterative algorithm schematically depicted in Fig.
2. The algorithm is inspired by Walrasian taˆtonnement [12].
Each producer updates its nominal dispatch and participation
factor based on the corresponding prices for energy and
reserve. Upon receiving updates from producers, the price-
setting problems adjust the prices. The algorithm formulates
as the following iterating procedure:
(p, α)← argmin (3a) for given λe, λr, (6a)
λe ←λe − ρ
[∑
i∈G
pi + w
f − L
]
, (6b)
λr ←λr − ρ
[∑
i∈G
αi − 1
]
, (6c)
where prices in (6b) and (6c) evolve through iterations along
the decent directions∇λe (3b) and∇λr (3c), respectively, with a
suitable step size ρ > 0. If the aggregated energy and reserve
exceed the corresponding market needs, energy and reserve
prices will be reduced to minimize the imbalance. Likewise,
these prices increase for any shortage of aggregated energy
and reserve supplies. This requires ρ to be properly selected.
As objective function of each producer in (3a) is strictly con-
vex in their decision variables, the algorithm in (6) provably
converges to the solution of equilibrium problem (3), provided
that a solution exists [13].
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In Section V-A we introduce an evaluation framework
to assess the efficiency of the proposed chance-constrained
equilibrium model with forecast asymmetry. In Section V-B
we explain a stylized system setup. In Sections V-C to V-E,
we introduce a set of experiments to (a) analyze the impacts
of the number of samples within the dataset of each producer
on the overall system performance, (b) analyze the system-
wide benefits when producers learn from their datasets, and
(c) show the overall and individual benefits from data sharing.
Update of producer 1
Update p1, α1 using (6a)
Update of producer i
Update pi, αi using (6a)
Energy price update
Update λe using (6b)
Reserve price update
Update λr using (6c)
. . .
p 1
p
i
λ
e λ e
α
1 α i
λ r
λ
r
Fig. 2. Proposed iterative approach based on Walrasian taˆtonnement to
determine the market equilibrium point.
A. Evaluation framework
To assess the impacts of forecast asymmetry among con-
ventional producers on the overall market performance, we
use the evaluation framework schematically depicted in Fig.
3. Here, each producer i receives a sample-based dataset
Di = {wi1,..., wis} with Nsi samples from its private data
provider. In the next step, producers process their own data to
estimate the variance σˆi and the support of the forecast error
distribution contained between bounds wi and wi. Then, the
optimal nominal dispatch p⋆i and participation factor α
⋆
i are
obtained from algorithm (6). To assess the efficiency of day-
ahead decisions p⋆i in real-time, we make an out-of-sample
analysis over the set D = {w1,..., ws} with N number of
samples. We choose N = 3 · 105. In all experiments, we
consider Di and D containing independent and identically
distributed random samples.
One of the common methods to assess the constraint viola-
tion level is to verify the frequency of feasible solution given
constraints (5) and optimal values p⋆i . The method assumes that
producers are equipped with automatic control and respond
to uncertainty realization according to the affine function (1).
However, this approach overlooks the cost associated with the
real-time extreme actions such as renewable power spillage
and load curtailment. Adopting the approach from [14], we
consider, instead, that the system is capable of re-dispatching
power producers closer to real-time operations. Taking into
account ws as the renewable power production realized in real-
time, each producer adjusts its production in real-time denoted
by ri to offset the imbalance in a cost-efficient manner. The
corresponding re-dispatch problem in real time formulates as
min
ri,w
c,
ls,ce
C :=
∑
i∈G
(
c2i (p
⋆
i + ri)
2
+ c1i (p
⋆
i + ri)
)
+ ce (7a)
s.t.
∑
i∈G
ri + l
s + ws − w
c = 0, (7b)
p
i
≤ p⋆i + ri ≤ pi, ∀i ∈ G, (7c)
− ri ≤ ri ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ G, (7d)
ce = ccwc + csls, (7e)
0 ≤ wc ≤ wf + ws, (7f)
0 ≤ ls ≤ L, (7g)
Compute optimal set
points using (6)
Data processing
by producer 1
Data provider
of producer 1
Data processing
by producer i
Data provider
of producer i
.
.
. Solve re-dispatch
problem (7) ∀s
Out-of-sample
data
Results
σˆ
21
w
1 ,w
1
σˆ
2 i
w
i
, w
i
D1
Di
p⋆i
D
ν
,C
Fig. 3. Evaluation framework.
where the objective function (7a) includes the total generation
cost of conventional producers as well as emergency cost ce
induced by renewable power spillage wc and load curtailment
ls, required when the market is in deficit of reserve capacity.
The renewable power spillage cost cc and load curtailment
cost cs are commonly set high, so that the market prioritizes
adjusting the production of flexible conventional producers.
Observe, that the generating cost in (7a) is a deterministic
variant of (2a) once nominal dispatch for all producers p⋆i is
obtained. Similarly, constraints of producers in (7c)-(7d) are
indeed deterministic variants of (2b). Whenever either wc or
ls is positive, we record the empirical violation ν of constraint
(2b) and corresponding reliability level (1− ν). Despite orig-
inal constraint set violation, the problem remains feasible due
to additional flexibility from wc or ls. Therefore, we can assess
operating cost C for any realization of uncertainty. Notice,
that the centralized re-dispatch problem (7) is solely used for
the evaluation procedure, and its decentralized counterpart is
achieved by the same means of algorithm (6).
As producers receive different samples at each run of the
evaluation framework, we make 50 simulation runs for each
Nsi to increase the statistical significance of the results.
B. Experimental setup
We consider a set of two conventional producers G ∈ {1, 2}
with maximum capacity pi = {32, 44} MW, minimum capac-
ity p
i
= {10, 10} MW, adjustment capability ri = {10, 10}
MW, and cost coefficients c2i = {1, 3} and c1i = {10, 3}.
The mean forecast of renewable power production is wf = 50
MW that supplies a half of system load L = 100 MW. The
renewable spillage cost cc and load curtailment cost cs are
set to $100/MWh and $300/MWh, respectively. We set factor
ρ to a small value of 10−5 in (6) to isolate forecast impacts
from those caused by algorithmic errors. Finally, we notice
that convergence time is kept below several minutes.
C. Impacts of the size of sample-based dataset of producers
The first experiment assesses the connection between the
size of each producer’s sample-based dataset, i.e., the num-
ber of samples in their dataset, and the overall operational
efficiency of the market. Without the loss of generality, we
assume that renewable power forecast errors follow normal
distribution N (0, σ2) with σ2 = 50, known to each data
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Fig. 4. Impacts of the size of sample-based dataset of producers: The upper
plot illustrates the data dissimilarity among producers in the variance (σˆi) and
interval (w
i
) of the forecast error distribution. The intermediate plot depicts
the empirical reliability level of the system (1-ν). The lower plot shows the
average out-of-sample cost (C) and the expectation across 5% of the worst-
case scenarios (CVaR(5%)). The upper and lower bounds of the envelopes
around the solid lines are obtained from the variance of an indicator over 50
simulation runs normalized to the average.
provider. The producers, though, receive only Nsi number of
samples, ranging from 10 to 104. Therefore, producers have
different estimates of the variance and forecast error bounds
that gradually improve in Nsi . To measure the level of forecast
asymmetry among producers for some Nsi , we use the ℓ2-norm
as a dissimilarity measure. We consider ‖σˆ21− σˆ
2
2‖, where σˆ
2
i
is a 1×50 vector of variance estimates of producer i obtained
after 50 simulations of the evaluation framework. In the same
way, we measure the dissimilarity of the interval of forecast
error distribution defined as wi = wi −wi.
The projections of the size of sample-based dataset of
producers as their private forecast data on the system reliability
and out-of-sample cost are depicted in Fig. 4. With data
scarcity, the dissimilarity of forecasts among producers is
kept high so they have different expectations over underlying
uncertainty distribution. As a result, the system runs at a poor
expected reliability level with large variance, subsequently
resulting in a large variation of the cost in 5% of the worst-
case scenarios (CVaR(5%)) due to emergent renewable power
curtailment and load shedding. This scenario corresponds to
the first entry in Fig. 1. With increasing size of sample-
based dataset, forecasts of producers gradually align, so the
variance of the empirical system reliability reduces, and the
expected reliability level exceeds 99% with the size of sample-
based dataset Nsi = 10
2, yielding the smallest variance of
CVaR(5%). We relate the range N
s
i ∈ [10
2, 103] to the second
entry in Fig. 1. Notice, the equilibrium solution obtained with
Nsi > 10
3 converges to the ideal solution provided by the
centralized model (2) using perfect forecast. Finally, we notice
that the empirical reliability level in Fig. 4 serves as a proxy
0
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Fig. 5. Learning from data: The upper plot shows the data dissimilarity of
producers in the estimators of beta distribution (αˆi, βˆi). The intermediate plot
illustrates the empirical system reliability (1-ν). The lower plot depicts the
average out-of-sample cost (C). The upper and lower bounds of the envelopes
around the solid lines are obtained from the variance of an indicator over 50
simulation runs normalized to the average.
function to the condition on size of sample-based dataset in
[11] that can be used to imposed probabilistic guarantee for
the decentralized algorithm in (6).
D. Learning from data
When data is limited, it is reasonable to assume that
producers learn statistical properties of underlying uncertainty
from the data at hand. In this experiment, we consider that
the renewable power forecast errors are obtained from a beta
distribution with parameters α˜ = 5 and β˜ = 10 scaled by
a factor of 65. We assume that the producers are aware of
the type of distribution and estimate their parameters from
datasets Di relying on maximum likelihood estimation. Once
producer estimates αˆi and βˆi are obtained, they generate
N = 3 · 105 number of samples in attempt to recover the true
distribution. Then, each producer enriches the initial datasetDi
with generated N samples and enforces constraints (5) over a
new set of samples. Similarly to the previous experiment, we
consider ℓ2-norm as a dissimilarity measure for αˆi and βˆi.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Fig. 5.
With a small number of samples, the two producers demon-
strate highly divergent estimates of the true parameters of
beta distribution. However, the system reliability significantly
improves compared to the direct implementation of the data at
hand. This observation is aligned with the randomization ap-
proach in [11]. On the other hand, the poor statistical estimates
of the true distribution yield the large variance of the expected
operating cost. The increasing size of sample-based dataset
improves the statistical significance of producers estimates.
Eventually, when producers data is subject to learning, the
system reaches a high level of reliability and small variance
23
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Fig. 6. Data sharing: The upper plot shows the average and variance of
empirical system reliability (1-ν) over 50 simulation runs. The intermediate
and lower plots depict the expected payoffs (Π1 and Π2) of the two producers
in 50 simulation runs, where the solid line illustrates the average value.
of operating cost significantly sooner than in the reference case
with no learning.
E. Data sharing
Data sharing among producers can be seen as a natural way
to enhance operational performance of the system. However,
the data sharing among producers is meaningful if producers
have strong incentives. To estimate producer incentives, we
consider the payoff of each generator in some admissible
uncertainty scenario s according to the following function
Πis = λ
epi+λ
rαi − c2i (pi + ris)
2 − c1i (pi + ris) ,
where the first two terms compute the revenue by selling
energy and reserve, while the last two terms define the actual
cost incurred under scenario s.
Similarly to the first experiment, we consider forecast error
distribution N (0, σ2) with σ2 = 50. The system reliability
is opposed to the expected payoff of producers for different
size of sample-based datasets in Fig. 6. We observe that
up to size of sample-based dataset Nsi = 3 · 10
2, data
sharing significantly improves the system reliability, but loses
its value with a larger number of samples as the dataset
of producers becomes sufficiently large. The improvement in
system reliability, however, does not come at the expense of
any of producers. In contrast, we observe that the average
expected payoff for the two producers is higher and with
smaller variation when they share data. Moreover, the lower
bound on payoffs tends to increase with data sharing for almost
any size of sample-based dataset.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper models the renewable power forecast asymmetry
among market participants and studies its impacts on mar-
ket equilibrium. The forecast of each participant is modeled
in form of private samples, internalized into their profit-
maximizing objectives and constraint sets. Our numerical ex-
periments show that the market-clearing outcomes are strongly
conditioned by the quality and asymmetry of private forecasts.
The system reliability and operating cost improve significantly
with the increasing availability of historical renewable power
observations. However, if forecast availability is limited, the
system and the producers may individually benefit from learn-
ing statistical properties of the data at hand and from sharing
their private forecasts.
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